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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORTS-CHATTEL MORTGAGES

One Hyman was the owner of a truck, which was licensed and registered in
the State of New York. Hyman duly executed and delivered a chattel mortgage on
the truck to a third person who assigned the mortgage for value to defendant. The
mortgage was recorded according to the New York statutes in Queens County,
N. Y. Hyman kept possession of the truck, drove it to Florida and obtained Florida
registration plates for the vehicle. Then Hyman brought the truck to Pennsylvania
and sold it there to plaintiff, who paid full value for the truck and had no knowledge of the chattel mortgage on it. Defendant came into Pennsylvania, took possession of the truck forcibly and drove it to New York. Plaintiff brought an action
for conversion against the defendant in the Federal District Court, E.D. New York.
Held: Under the laws of the State of New York, a recorded
chattel mortgage
is
could oband the mortgagee
valid as against even an innocent purchaser for value

tain possession by seizure; but in Pennsylvania an innocent purchaser for value
acquires a good title to a chattel as against a chattel mortgagee. The law of the
place where the wrongdoer's conduct occurs determines his liability. Judgment for
plaintiff. Federman v. Verni, 42 F. Supp. 113.
"The great weight of authority is to the effect that a chattel mortgage, properly executed and recorded according to the law of the place where the mortgage is
executed and the property is located, will, if valid there, be held valid even as
against creditors and purchasers for value in good faith in another state to which
the property is removed." 11 C.J. 424-426. The editors cite, in support of this
proposition, over one hundred cases from thirty-three jurisdictions. At page 426 it
is said, "In Louisiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas, the doctrines ofthe pre-

ceding paragraphs are not recognized and the rights of a foreign mortgagee will
not be upheld as to innocent purchasers." The Pennsylvania cases citedare MacCabe v. Blymire, 9 Phila. 615; Armitage v. Spahn, 4 Dist. 270, 8 York 159; State
Bank of Sherman v. Carr, 15 Pa. Super. 346.
Corpus Juris Secundum states the majority rule (14 C.J.S. 608), but goes on
to state, at page 609, "In a few states, however, the doctrines of the general rule,
as announced above, are not recognized, and unless a foreign mortgage has the

advantage of prior recordation within the state to which the property is removed,
the rights of the foreign mortgagee will not be upheld as to innocent purchasers
and attaching creditors." Here are cited cases from Louisiana, Texas, and Pennsylvania, among them Commercial Banking Corp. v. Berkowitz, 104 Pa. Super. 523,
159 A. 214, 216; Kaufman and Baer v. Monroe Motor Line Transportation,Inc.,
124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 A. 296.

Section 268(1) of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws is as follows:

"If,

after a chattel is validly mortgaged, it is taken into another state without the consent
of the mortgagee, the interest of the mortgagee is not divested as a result of any
dealings with the chattel in the second state". Comment (c) to that section says,
"Under the rule stated in this section the interest of the mortgagee is not divested
by any dealings with the chattel in the second state whether such dealings consist
of a sale by the mortgagor to a purchaser for value without notice, or of an attachment or execution levied by a creditor of the mortgagor." The Pennsylvania Annotations to this volume of the Restatement cite, as being contra to this section,
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Armitage v. Spahn, supra; Commonwealt3 v. One Five Passenger Overland Sedan,
90 Pa. Super. 376; Commonwealth v. Gutshall, 4 D. & C. 683.
"The validity of a chattel mortgage is determined by the law of the situs of
the chattel at the time of the mortgage. Rights created under a valid mortgage will
be recognized in another state as against the mortgagor or his creditors or subsequent purchasers from him. The typical situation is that in which property in one
state is made the subject of a chattel mortgage executed there, a transaction valid
where made. Then the mortgagor takes the property into another state, where it is
seized by one of his creditors or sold to a third party, neither creditor nor purchaser having knowledge of the mortgagee's rights. There is no record of the
mortgage in the second state. The general consensus of judicial opinion in this
situation is that the rights of the mortgagee are to be protected." Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (Hornbook Series, Second Edition), 418. He cites cases from Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Wyoming, and notes in 64
L.R.A. 356, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 386, 57 A.L.R. 702, in support of this contention,
and Allison v. Teeters, 176 Mich. 216, 142 N.W. 340, as representing the minority rule.
Beale, in his work on Conflict of Laws, Volume II, pp. 992 to 996, says, "So
in the case of a mortgaged chattel, removal of the chattel to another state does not
of itself affect the interest of the mortgagee." He cites here, in support of this
rule, over fifty cases from thirty jurisdictions, and cases to the contrary from Michigan and Maryland. "In Pennsylvania and Louisiana a chattel mortgage is not
only not allowed by law, but is so strongly against the policy of the states that a
foreign chattel mortgage created in another state will be given absolutely no effect." Armitage v. Spahn, supra, and State Bank of Sherman v. Carr, supra, are
given as the Pennsylvania citations.
Thus it appears that, although the Pennsylvania rule against foreign chattel
mortgages is very much the minority view, the law is so well settled here on the
subject, and the rule that the lex loci delictus governs actions of tort is so universal,
that the Federal Courts will give judgment against a defendant who acted according to the law of his own state and most of the other states of the United States.
R. W. McW.

ARBITRATION-BUILDING CONTRACT-IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCEJUDICIAL REVIEW OF AWARD-FINAL JUDGES OF LAW AND FACT

A construction contract provided that "by submitting a bid the bidder agrees
that he has examined the site and specifications and drawings, and where the specifications require in any part of the work a given result to be produced, that the
specifications and drawings are adequate and the desired result can be produced
under the specifications and drawings," and also provided, "no claim for any extra
work will be allowed because of alleged impossibilities in the production of the
results specified, or because of inadequate or improper plans and specifications and
wherever a result is required, the successful bidder shall furnish any and all extras
and make any changes, to produce . . . the required result." The successful bidder

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

Armitage v. Spahn, supra; Commonwealt3 v. One Five Passenger Overland Sedan,
90 Pa. Super. 376; Commonwealth v. Gutshall, 4 D. & C. 683.
"The validity of a chattel mortgage is determined by the law of the situs of
the chattel at the time of the mortgage. Rights created under a valid mortgage will
be recognized in another state as against the mortgagor or his creditors or subsequent purchasers from him. The typical situation is that in which property in one
state is made the subject of a chattel mortgage executed there, a transaction valid
where made. Then the mortgagor takes the property into another state, where it is
seized by one of his creditors or sold to a third party, neither creditor nor purchaser having knowledge of the mortgagee's rights. There is no record of the
mortgage in the second state. The general consensus of judicial opinion in this
situation is that the rights of the mortgagee are to be protected." Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (Hornbook Series, Second Edition), 418. He cites cases from Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Wyoming, and notes in 64
L.R.A. 356, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 386, 57 A.L.R. 702, in support of this contention,
and Allison v. Teeters, 176 Mich. 216, 142 N.W. 340, as representing the minority rule.
Beale, in his work on Conflict of Laws, Volume II, pp. 992 to 996, says, "So
in the case of a mortgaged chattel, removal of the chattel to another state does not
of itself affect the interest of the mortgagee." He cites here, in support of this
rule, over fifty cases from thirty jurisdictions, and cases to the contrary from Michigan and Maryland. "In Pennsylvania and Louisiana a chattel mortgage is not
only not allowed by law, but is so strongly against the policy of the states that a
foreign chattel mortgage created in another state will be given absolutely no effect." Armitage v. Spahn, supra, and State Bank of Sherman v. Carr, supra, are
given as the Pennsylvania citations.
Thus it appears that, although the Pennsylvania rule against foreign chattel
mortgages is very much the minority view, the law is so well settled here on the
subject, and the rule that the lex loci delictus governs actions of tort is so universal,
that the Federal Courts will give judgment against a defendant who acted according to the law of his own state and most of the other states of the United States.
R. W. McW.

ARBITRATION-BUILDING CONTRACT-IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCEJUDICIAL REVIEW OF AWARD-FINAL JUDGES OF LAW AND FACT

A construction contract provided that "by submitting a bid the bidder agrees
that he has examined the site and specifications and drawings, and where the specifications require in any part of the work a given result to be produced, that the
specifications and drawings are adequate and the desired result can be produced
under the specifications and drawings," and also provided, "no claim for any extra
work will be allowed because of alleged impossibilities in the production of the
results specified, or because of inadequate or improper plans and specifications and
wherever a result is required, the successful bidder shall furnish any and all extras
and make any changes, to produce . . . the required result." The successful bidder

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

was put to extra expense through necessary use of a more expensive paint to produce the required result outlined in detail under the contract. The parties agreed
that the question of liability should be submitted to arbitration under tht general
arbitration clause in the contract. The arbitrators found for the construction company for $20,000. Held: the arbitrators' findings, reversed under the State Agency
clause, Section 16 of the Act of 1927, P.L. 381, and under Section 11(d) of the
Act of 1927. This provides that where the award is against the law and had it
been a verdict of a jury, the Court could have entered a different or other judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the Court may modify and correct the award or resubmit the matter to the arbitrators. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Turner
Construction Co., 343 Pa. 512 (1942).
There was no question that under the language of the contract, as a matter of
law, the contractor should not be permitted to maintain a claim against the Authority for the extra cost and had the claim been made for the extra cost by the contractor in the ordinary way, by suit in assumpsit, the Court would have been required
to give binding instructions against it. The question arises whether the fact that
the parties resorted to arbitration alters the situation and enables the contractor to
recover his claim. This, the Court said, turns upon whether the arbitration was at
common law or under the Act of 1927.
At common law an award of the arbitrators cannot be impeached by direct
attack except for fraud, misconduct, or misbehavior. To state the rule differently,
the parties who voluntarily submit matters in dispute to arbitration are bound by
the award of the arbitrators unless it is shown that the parties were not given a
hearing, or that-there was fraud, misconduct, corruption or some other irregularity
on the part of the arbitrators which caused them to render an unjust, inequitable or
unconscionable award. Gratz v. Phillips, 14 S. & R. 114; Merrick's Estate, 5 W.
& C. 9 (which even -excludes fraud); Ruch v. York, 233 Pa. 24, 79 A. 812; Huckenstein v. Kaufman, 173 Pa. 199, 33 A. 1028. It should be noted here that the
Arbitration Act of 1927 does not entirely displace arbitration at common law.
Goldstein y. International L. G. W. Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 A. 43; Pierce Steel
Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332, 179 A. 558, but rather the Act of 1927
changes the common law with respect to certain agreements to arbitrate; it provides
a remedy under which arbitration takes place and whereby one of the parties may
compel the other to arbitrate, but there is nothing in the Act to repeal the old time
arbitration, or prevent suits on the award if the parties choose to follow that
course; the Act is not exclusive, but it does provide a more effective remedy for
prosecuting arbitration agreements. Isaac v. D. & C. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 301
Pa. 351, 152 A. 95.
Thus, as there still may be common law arbitration today, where the arbitrators make a final and complete award, such arbitrators under the common law give
an award which will be confirmed by the Court, as it is said "The arbitrators are
the final judges of both law and fact." The phrase "final judges of both law and
fact" has come into prominence in the learned opinions of the Pennsylvania courts
in respect to arbitration since the passage of the Arbitration Act of 1927 as a means
by which common law arbitration can be distinguished from the statutory arbitration as set up by the Act. Under the common law, the arbitrators' award was conclusive (in the absence of fraud, misconduct or misbehavior) even though a plain
mistake was made in a matter of law or fact or there was a substantial defect in the
award. Buckwalter v. Russell, 119 Pa. 495, 13 A. 310; Lackawanna Iron & Steel
Co. v. Lackawanna & Western Valley R. R. Co., 299 Pa. 503, 149 A. 702; Speer
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v. Bidwell, 44 Pa. 23; John A. Donahue & Son v. Barclay White Co., 9 D. & C.
303. Under the Act of 1927 the Court may modify or correct any award of arbitration (A) where there was (1) an evident material miscalculation of figures, or
(2) an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award, or (B) where the award is against the law, and is
such that had it feen a verdict of the jury the Court could have entered a different
or other judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Act of 1927, P.L. 381, Section
11 (a) and (c). Under the statute, therefore, a mistake of law or fact will overthrow the award of the arbitrators and, thus, the arbitrators are not technically as
completely "final judges of both law and fact" as they would be if the parties had
submitted to common law arbitration. Under statutory arbitration the law binds
the arbitrators which apparently is not the case under common law arbitration.
The courts recently have taken this "means-to-an-end" phrase and have made
it into a general rule and have in direct contravention of the Act of 1927 attempted
to apply the statement to all arbitration. Mr. Justice Schaffer in P. 0. S. of A. Hall
Ass'n. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 107, at 116, said, "It would seem to be
the policy of our law, as evidenced by the Act of 1927, P.L. 381, not to permit
findings of arbitrators to be set aside except in very few instances. The general
rule undoubtedly is that, unless restricted by the agreement of submission, arbitrators are final judges of both law and fact and an award will not be reviewed or
set aside for mistake of either." This dictum has been approved by the courts in
numerous instances and it appears as though the present case has recognized its
tendency. Justice Schaffer, however, seems to have ignored Section 11 of the Act
of 1927 which allows the court to modify or correct any mistake of law or fact,
resident in the award, the only limitation being on the necessity for materiality.
In P. 0. S. of A. Hall Ass'n. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra, and Isaac v. Donegal
and Comoy Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 301 Pa. 351, 152 A. 95, a policy of fire insurance was involved and an appraisement of property was made by appraisers appointed by the parties. From these cases above the principle embodied in the general rule was evolved, the only requirement being a complete and full award.
Neither of the so-called arbitrations in the fire insurance cases were under the arbitration Act of 1927, which may account for the discrepancy.
The proverbial grain of salt is thus a good index for the statement that "arbitrators are the final judges of law and fact". Though it is relatively positive for
common law arbitration even in this day, the answer for statutory arbitration review by the courts is embogied in Section 11 of the Arbitration Act of 1927 and
by no means in a statement'handed down by the courts as dictum, which arose from
an innocent court-made justification for distinction between the two types of arbitration prevalent in Pennsylvania today--common law and statutory.
W. D. B.

DICKINSON LAW' REVIEV
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND

FREE SPEECH

Petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board
enjoining tht defendant from refusing to bargain collectively with the local
union of the C.I.O. and further enjoining it from interfering with the privileges
given in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 157. This
section states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives

of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activity, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." A local union began to
organize in the defendant's plant and the board found the defendant guilty of
interfering with organizing activities and rcfusing to bargain collectively after
the union was formed. An officer of the defendant spoke with one employee
who was active in organizing the union, and said the union was "just a bunch
of blackmailers trying to collect dues and it won't get you anywhere in the end.
They won't secure your job." The officer then made a statement that if the
plant organized it would have to be closed for more than six months of each
year. Other acts against organizers were practiced by the defendant's officers,
ut none were of a violent character. There was strong evidence to show that
the defendant refused to bargain with the union after it was organized. Held:
The board found that the defendant was refusing to bargain with the union and
the court held the evidence sufficient to support such conclusion. The court also
upheld the board's refusal to base the order on an election to determine whether
the union had a majority of the employees. The defendant's argument that the
order invaded its right to free speech was not accepted. The court held that the
voicing of opinions concerning unions is acceptable to certain audiences but when
made to employees it has a force of persuasion which results in coercion and it
is then that such speech may be limited. It was also decided that the board's decision that the opinions voiced to an employee by the officer of the defendant
were of the character of coercion rather than a mere conviction which the employee could ignore. N.L.R.B. v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 Fed. Rep. (2nd) 354.
The problem of free speech as guaranteed in the first amendment to the
Constitution, U.S.C.A., Constitutional Amendment 1, has confronted the N.L.R.
B. in many of the cases presented to it. Their treatment of this problem has
varied due to the impossibility of establishing a definite rule to cover the entire
field of cases under this problem. This was shown in N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 693 (1941), where Chief Justice Stone pointed out
that the board's use of the cease and desist order under section 7 (supra) should
'vary according to the individual problem of each case and the circumstances under it.
In the case of N.L.R.B. v. Ford Motor Co., i14 Fed.(2nd) 905 (1940), it
was held that under the constitutional amendment concerning freedom of speech,
the right to hold views upon any and all controversial questions, to express such
views, and to disseminate them to persons who may be interested, is guaranteed.
The court further said that the right to disseminate information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute is within the area of free discussion and so guaranteed.
Unless the right of free speech is enjoyed by employer as well as employee, the
guarantee of the first amendment is futile, so states the court. This case is the
foundation for that group which feels that the right to free speech should in no
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case be limited by an order of the N.L.R.B. By this holding the acts of distributing pamphlets to employees and of expressing the employer's unfavorable attitude to unions were permitted under this constitutional guarantee of free
speech, and therefore could not be enjoined by an order of the N.L.R.B. Justice
Mahoney seems to favor to a limited extent the holding of the N.L.R.B. v. Ford
Motor Co. case (supra) when he states:
"As an abstract proposition it may be conceded that the constitittional right of freedom of speech . . . in regard to labor matters is
just as clearly a right of employers as of employees." N.L.R.B. v.
Reed and Prince Mfg. Co., 118 Fed.(2nd) 874, p. 889 (1941);
Continental Box Co. v. N.L.R.B., 113 Fed.(2nd) 93 (1940).
The other view is that the N.L.R.B. should be allowed to limit an employer's right of free speech. This limitation is not considered a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech for this right is not absolute but may be
limited in certain cases. Limitations have been placed upon it in civil and criminal prosecutions for duress, fraud, and libel, speech being an agency of each.
The distinguishing feature that determines if the employer's speech should be
enjoined or permitted is whether it is an expression coercive in nature or one of
mere opinion. It was recognized by the court in the cas-e of Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmorx Dairies, Inc., 61 Sup. Ct. 552 (1941), that free
spccch can be used as a part of an instrument of force rather than an appeal to
icason. An employer's mere expression of opinion may lose its significance as
an appeal to reason in a contest of violence, intimidation or coercion and when
the court finds this to exist the employer's right of free speech ends. Virginia
Ferry Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 101 Fed.(2nd) 103 (1939). Under this view
the right of free speech is not absolute, but is qualified in regard to labor cases
depending upon whether it is merely an expression of opinion or coercive in
nature.
The tendency of the recent cases decided under the N.L.R.B. is to undermine the relatively unlimited freedom of speech as held in the N.L.R.B. v. Ford
Motor Co. (supra), and to place the right of freedom of speech on the question
whether the employer's speech was an expression of opinion or one of coercion. The
extent to which the N.L.R.B. can limit the employer's right of free speech is not
certain, but Chief Justice Stone expresses his view on this point, when he states in
N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Co., (supra), that the board's. use of the cease
and desist order under section 7 of the N.L.R. act should be used with cautioft
and its scope should not be too broad. The holding in the case under discussion
goes quite far in its limitation of the employer-defendant's freedom of speech
for the language used by its officer was not of a strongly coercive nature but the
coercion was indirect and subtle. However, the Board and the Circuit Court of
Appeals considered this to be sufficient to be subjected to limitation, which is
only indicative of the modern trend, that is to prevent any form of coercion to
be practiced by tht employer on the employee in connection with labor union
problems.
W. W. H.

